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Non-Consequentialist Theories of Animal Ethics
1
 
 
The debate over how to construct a broadly animal-protective ethical theory has, 
mercifully, moved beyond the old Singer-versus-Regan duality that was dominant for 
so long.  On the consequentialist side of things, Jeff McMahan has developed a 
nuanced view that builds off Singer while arguably avoiding certain shortcomings in 
Singer’s own position.2 On the other side, Regan’s view has faded from the scene and 
instead non-consequentialists have been hard at work, especially in just the last 10 
years, developing new theories that, in my view, are much better than Regan’s.3 My 
plan here is to review and critique three compelling and philosophically rich efforts 
along those lines: Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantianism, Mark Rowlands’s 
contractarianism, and Martha Nussbaum’s capability-based approach.  This is not 
meant to suggest that other recent non-consequentialist work in animal ethics is 
unworthy of our attention.  Rather, these three theorists happened to have piqued my 
interest and that of many other philosophers, and so with the limited space I have here 
it seems most sensible to focus on them. 
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 This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Applied Philosophy in July 2015.  
I thank the audience there for its feedback. 
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 See, for instance, McMahan 2002.  McMahan’s view on killing animals can be found in chap. 3, and 
his amendment to Singer’s view can be found on pp. 347-62.  McMahan is not a consequentialist, I 
realize, since he holds that some beings possess moral inviolability.  However, it’s accurate to say that 
he’s a consequentialist about animal ethics since he considers almost all animals to lack moral 
inviolability and contends, further, that when inviolability is out of the picture the wrongness of killing 
a being varies with the time-relative strength of the interest the being has in continuing to live.  (Rahul 
Kumar agrees, calling McMahan’s interest-weighing theory “broadly, though not officially, 
utilitarian”; see Kumar 2008:64.) See also McMahan’s (2005:534-5) comments on killing animals for 
medical research. 
   It should be noted, finally, that in more recent work McMahan has flirted with the possibility of 
adopting an even more consequentialist view regarding the ethics of killing.  See McMahan 2008. 
3
 Since my goal here is to review new non-consequentialist work in animal ethics, I omit a critique of 
Regan’s theory here.  But what I would have said has been said already, by Mark Rowlands (2009:86-
93). 
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1. Korsgaard’s Neo-Kantianism 
 
 I begin with Korsgaard because she sets the agenda for non-consequentialist theories 
of animal ethics in what strikes me as precisely the right way: non-consequentialists 
need to improve on Kant.  Kant, quite famously, rejected the claim that we have 
duties to animals and argued instead that we have duties with regard to certain 
animals (or, as it is often awkwardly put, we have “indirect duties to” certain 
animals).  Improving on Kant means, quite simply, establishing that we have duties to 
at least some animals.  This basic idea can be expressed in other terms; differing 
expressions will each respectively be a better fit in different theories.  So we might 
speak of animals having claims on us, or having rights, or being the kind of entity that 
can be wronged.  But it’s all basically the same idea (I would argue). 
 Why is this the agenda?  Because of our case-specific intuitions.  For most 
people, if they were to be presented with a vignette describing a pointless act of 
extreme violence against (say) a horse, an ape, or a dog, they would judge not only 
that the act was wrong but that the animal was a victim of that wrong.
4
 To validate 
this intuition it’s necessary to establish that we can have duties to some animals.  That 
this should be the agenda for non-consequentialist theories of animal ethics becomes 
even more clear when we consider why non-consequentialists themselves would 
consider animal ethics to be worth their time.  If the agenda were merely to 
demonstrate that we can have duties with regard to animals, non-consequentialists 
                                                          
4
 Kant admits this and attempts to explain away the intuition.  See his comments on amphiboly (Kant 
1996: Akademie edition pagination 6:442). 
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could be satisfied with what Kant himself said.
5
 So the agenda must be more 
ambitious, and since there’s no middle ground between having duties merely with 
regard to animals and having duties to some animals, the agenda must be to establish 
that the latter is the case. 
 Korsgaard aims to show that Kant’s theory actually allows for this.  She 
begins by admitting that duties to animals cannot be extracted from the first 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative.  But even from the perspective of Kantian 
ethics this is no major strike against the existence of duties to animals, since, 
according to Korsgaard (2005:98), many central duties to humans also cannot be 
inferred from the first formulation.  So a turn to the second formulation is inevitable. 
 Korsgaard then asks: On what grounds are we obligated to resist treating 
humanity as a mere means?  Here Korsgaard makes the crucial point that it is not on 
account of humanity possessing an out-there-in-the-world absolute value.  For the 
Kantian, value is constructed through the will.  Certain ways of acting present 
themselves to us in a “normatively loaded” way (Korsgaard (2005:83; see also 
2009:114)), which is to say that they strike us as worth doing or worth avoiding.  For 
instance they whet an appetite, incite a passion or arouse a curiosity (Korsgaard 
2011:102), or stoke a desire or fear (Korsgaard 2013:637).
 
 Korsgaard calls these 
mental states incentives.  She goes on to say that when an individual with the capacity 
for reflective endorsement endorses an incentive she confers value on the incentivized 
way of acting and makes it an end in itself (Korsgaard (2011:106; see also 2005:92-3, 
2012:8 and 2013:640)).  So if we are obligated to resist treating humanity as a mere 
means, this must be because we reflectively endorse humanity—the capacity for 
                                                          
5
 This is true even for those non-consequentialists who aren’t Kantians, since there’s nothing distinctly 
Kantian about Kant’s argument for duties with regard to animals.  What he says could be taken on 
board by just about anyone. 
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reflective endorsement itself.  And in reflectively endorsing humanity, we impose on 
ourselves a law requiring that we respect humanity (Korsgaard (2005:93-5; 2012:9-
10)). 
 What’s key to Korsgaard’s argument regarding animals is her further claim 
that our humanity is not the only aspect of our nature that we reflectively endorse.  
She contends that we reflectively endorse a range of incentives that fall under our 
animal nature, such as seeking pleasure, sex, and play and avoiding pain, mutilation 
and loss of control (Korsgaard (2005:105; 2011: 108; 2013:643)). 
 This gets us to the endorsement of animal nature, but it still doesn’t get us to 
duties to animals.  This is because we haven’t yet established the scope of our self-
legislative ability.  Isn’t it possible for a human to reflectively endorse only her own 
animal nature, and thus to lay down for herself only a very narrow law requiring that 
she not treat her own animality as a mere means (Korsgaard 2005:100f)? Of course by 
the same token one might wonder whether one could avoid incurring duties to other 
humans all the while endorsing one’s own humanity, which would of course be to 
prove too much.   
 Korsgaard responds that when one reflectively endorses an incentive one does 
not merely endorse one’s own instantiation of it.  Rather, one endorses it in general 
(Korsgaard (2005:104; 2012:13)).
6
 So the laws one gives to oneself through reflective 
endorsement include within their scope all the beings that possess the incentive being 
endorsed (Korsgaard (2005:105; 2012:13)). Thus others’ ends bind each of us.   
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 In an interesting footnote, Korsgaard (2005:104) offers the following analogy: 
…imagine a white male who claims that in valuing his own freedom he is only valuing the 
freedom of white males: if, unknown to himself, he turned out to be a black woman…then he 
would agree that his freedom doesn’t matter.  Our response would be that either he’s insincere 
or deceiving himself, that he’s suffering from a failure of reflective imagination. 
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 I have two worries about Korsgaard’s argument here.  First, assuming that it 
shows us that animals’ ends ground, by way of the formula of humanity, limits on 
how we are morally permitted to behave, it doesn’t actually show that abiding by 
those limits is a duty to animals.  Korsgaard says it does, but she has a very weak 
notion of ‘duty to’.  She contends that there are two ways in which an entity can be 
the kind of entity (an end-in-itself) to whom one can have duties.  The weaker of 
those two ways, and the one under which animals qualify, is by being a source of 
legitimate claims.  And what it means to be a source of legitimate claims is to be in a 
position to make a claim on a moral agent in the name of a law the authority of which 
is recognized by that agent (Korsgaard (2005:95-6; 2011:104,109)).  So this is what 
Korsgaard is saying is true of animals when she says that we have duties to them. 
 The only example Korsgaard offers of how one gets to be a source of claims in 
this sense, aside from the argument she gives to establish that animals qualify, is from 
the law: she says that individuals who are protected by laws that they had no part and 
could have no part in creating can be sources of claims in this sense (Korsgaard 
2011:107).  So if Country X has a law than bans raping people regardless of their 
nationality, this makes each foreign visitor to country X a source of claims in the 
given sense.  Each such visitor makes a claim on the citizens of Country X—a claim 
to not be raped—in the name of a law that is binding on those citizens all the while 
having played no part and not being the sort of person who could play a part in the 
creating of that law.  
 Note, however, that the laws of Country X might make it quite clear that 
violations of the prohibition on raping foreigners are to be treated as purely criminal 
violations, thus affording foreigners who have been raped no ability to register a civil 
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complaint or demand restitution.  In other words, the laws of Country X might make it 
quite clear that the raped party is to be afforded no standing.   
 Perhaps Korsgaard’s point, however, is that the mere fact that the foreigner 
had no part and could not possibly have had a part in creating the law is insufficient to 
establish that she lacks standing with respect to violations of the law.
7
 After all, the 
country could afford her standing if she were raped.  This is enough, it seems, to open 
up the possibility that animals could have standing with respect to the moral law 
despite having no part in creating it.  
 Fair enough.  Now taking it as given that animals could have standing with 
respect to the moral law, how can we figure out whether they do?  Since according to 
Korsgaard the moral law arises out of certain mental states (i.e., the reflective 
endorsement of incentives), one must look to those mental states to settle the question 
of whether some animal has standing with respect to the moral law it creates.  And 
when we do this, we find no answer.  There is nothing in the attitude of endorsing an 
incentive or refusing to endorse an incentive that could establish any fact one way or 
the other whether, if at some point I engage in an action that is inconsistent with my 
endorsement of some incentive, which of the individuals affected by that action will 
have standing with respect to it.  The worry then is that for all Korsgaard has said 
there is no fact of the matter as to whether animals have standing, and thus no fact of 
the matter as to whether we have duties to them.  
 My second objection is that Korsgaard actually hasn’t managed to show that 
animals’ ends ground, by way of the formula of humanity, limits on how we are 
morally permitted to behave.  To see why, we have to examine how prohibitions are 
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extracted from the second formulation of the categorical imperative.  Under the 
classical understanding of the second formulation, in which the concern is merely 
humanity, and animality is not mentioned, there are four ways of violating it: 
1. Treating one’s own humanity as a mere means. 
2. Treating the humanity of others as a mere means. 
3. Failure to treat one’s humanity as an end in itself. 
4. Failure to treat the humanity of another as an end in itself. 
In a much earlier publication Korsgaard (1996:125-8) offers an example of each kind 
of violation.  We need not review the examples of Type 1 and Type 3 violations, as 
for the purposes of this discussion we are concerned exclusively with our treatment of 
others (animals, specifically).  This leaves Type 2 and 4.  Let’s begin with the latter. 
 Korsgaard offers, as example of a Type 4 violation, failing to promote the 
happiness of others.  Happiness is achieved through the realization of ends that one 
sets for oneself, so a failure to promote the happiness of another is a failure to take 
seriously the value of her ends, which implies a failure to take seriously her capacity 
to confer value through endorsing something as an end.  Consequently we have a duty 
to promote the happiness of others. 
 Now the question arises: When we amend the second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative so that it mentions animality in addition to humanity, are there 
then more actions that constitute Type 4 violations?  Could I fail to set the animality 
of others as an end?  I might, but it’s hard to see what the objection to it would be.  If 
I fail to set the humanity of another as an end, this is objectionable because it 
constitutes a denial of that other to confer value on something through the act of 
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reflective endorsement.  Nothing analogous happens if I fail to set the animality of 
another as an end. 
 As to the Type 2 violation, Korsgaard offers the example of false promising.  
When people keep their promises this is an exercise of humanity—of good willing.  A 
false promise can work only when and because others keep their promises.  Therefore, 
false promises use the humanity of others as a mere means, and so we have a duty not 
to make them. 
 Now if we reformulate the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative 
so that it mentions both humanity and animality, are there then more ways of 
committing Type 2 violations?  Can I use the animality of others as a mere means?  
Well I might use a woman’s sex drive as a means to the satisfaction of my own.  But 
this would be wrong only if she didn’t consent.  But we already knew, from having 
consulted the original second formulation, that it’s not permissible for me to have sex 
with a woman without her consent.  So it doesn’t appear that we learn anything 
important by noting that the animality of another can be used as a mere means.  
 This is a surprising conclusion.  I would guess that most people share 
Korsgaard’s sense—and indeed even now I have to stop myself from getting carried 
away by the intuitive pull of it—that bringing animals and animality under the ambit 
of the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative must make some difference to 
how we’re permitted to treat them.  How could it be, for instance, that hunting 
animals for sport is not ruled out by this new formulation? 
 The answer, in short, is that animality was already covered by the second 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative before Korsgaard amended it.  Some uses 
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of another’s animality are ruled out by the unamended formulation—namely, all those 
uses of another’s animality that are also impermissible uses of another’s humanity.  
Getting someone drunk in order to make her want to have sex with you may constitute 
such an example.  Meanwhile, the rest of the uses of another’s animality are ruled in 
by the unamended formulation.  Having sex with someone with that person’s 
unimpaired consent would be one case.  
 But doesn’t that mean, one might ask, that for those individuals that lack 
humanity the amended second formulation tells us something that we didn’t know 
already regarding how it’s permissible to treat them—namely, that we shouldn’t use 
their animality as a mere means?  The first thing to note, by way of response, is that 
there is a risk of going too far here.  If, because I’m lazy, I train my dog to fetch my 
slippers, am I using an aspect of my dog’s animality (namely its instinct to retrieve) as 
a mere means to my end?  Surely we don’t want to say that, since that would be to 
condemn such dog training as immoral.  The obvious escape is to point out that there 
doesn’t seem to be anything objectionable, from the dog’s point of view, to fetching 
my slippers.  Now there are two ways to understand this.  We could simply 
understand this as a way of saying that such dog training doesn’t make my dog 
unhappy, but this observation is entirely out of place when considering whether such 
dog training is a Type 2 violation (it seems more appropriate to the question of 
whether it’s a Type 4 violation, but we’ve already seen why one cannot commit a 
Type 4 violation with respect to an animal).  Alternatively, we could understand this 
as a way of saying that my dog would, if she could, consent to being trained this way.  
This is precisely the route the Korsgaard elects to take.  She says (2011:110), “We 
may interact with the other animals as long as we do so in ways to which we think it 
is plausible to think they would consent if they could.” 
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 The problem here is that I cannot literally imagine my dog conferring or 
withholding consent.  My dog wouldn’t be that particular dog any more if it had the 
capacity to consent; it would be some other being.  Now I can imagine an animal just 
like my dog but with the added capacity for consent, and I can imagine her dissenting 
from certain ways of being treated.  But if that’s the basis for my duty to refrain from 
doing some particular thing to her, then it’s not her that constitutes the source of that 
duty; rather it’s the hypothetical agent I constructed.  And so it’s not a duty to her.  
 
2. Rowlands’s Contractarianism 
 
Rowlands’s goal is to develop Rawls’s contractarianism and demonstrate that, 
contrary to what Rawls and most of his commentators have thought, Rawls’s 
contractarianism provides the basis for ascribing rights to animals.  In what follows I 
offer a very brief summary of Rowlands’s argument, as found in chapter 6 of the 
revised and expanded edition of his Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice.  It 
doesn’t do justice to the nuance with which Rowlands approaches his subject, 
especially his careful exegesis of Rawls, but it will give us everything we need to 
assess Rowlands’s case for animal rights. 
 The key to that case is Rowlands’s view regarding the thickness of the veil of 
ignorance.  Rowlands emphasizes that the entire construction of the original position, 
including the veil of ignorance, is, for Rawls, to be based on prior moral 
commitments.  In other words, the original position is not supposed to be a morally 
neutral starting point.  Rather, it is supposed to embody the moral convictions of 
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which we are most confident and that play the most fundamental roles in our moral 
thought.  From these convictions, via the original position thought experiment, we are 
supposed to be able to derive further moral constraints.  Rowlands then points out that 
one of these central moral commitments is that if an individual is not responsible for 
possessing property P, then that individual is not entitled to whatever benefits accrue 
from her possession of P.  This is our anti-moral arbitrariness conviction.  Rowlands 
then makes his key move in defending animal rights: he points out being human is not 
something any of us are responsible for.  Therefore, given that from behind the veil of 
ignorance we are supposed to be ignorant of whatever properties of ours we are not 
responsible for, the veil of ignorance must then deprive us of the knowledge of our 
humanity.  And if we consider what set of rules we would endorse while not 
presupposing our humanity, we find that we would favour rules that afford many 
protections for animals, such as protection against being killed for food.
8
 
 As far as this goes, I say “fair enough”.  But how far does this get us?  
Rowlands (2009:119) thinks it gets us to the conclusion that animals have direct 
rights, for instance against being killed for food, where a direct right is a right the 
possession of which by X does not depend on the possession of a right by any other 
individual, Y.  (Direct rights can be thought of as the correlates of Kantian duties-to.)  
 The problem, however, is that we certainly wouldn’t want to say that anything 
protected by the set of rules agreed upon in the original position has direct rights.  We 
might, for instance, adopt a rule protecting certain inanimate objects like the Egyptian 
pyramids, and yet we wouldn’t want to say that the pyramids have direct rights.  
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 This strategy for incorporating animals into Rawls’s contractarianism was suggested much earlier by 
Donald VanDeVeer (1979) and Brian Barry (1989:204). 
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 The closest Rowlands comes to responding to this objection is when he says 
the following:  
…the scope of morality is restricted to things that an occupant of the original position could 
rationally worry about being.  I can, in the original position, worry about being at least certain 
sort of non-human animal since there is something that it is like to be them (at least some of 
them). […] But if I were told that I was going to be a rock then I couldn’t care less what 
happened to me (and rationally so). Therefore in the original position, I would not vote to 
include these under the scope of the principles of morality just in case I became one.  The 
contractarian position, then, makes sentience the cut-off point for morality... (2009: 160) 
There is an important ambiguity in Rowlands’s use of the expression “the scope of 
morality” in the first sentence of the block quote and “morality” in the last.  For 
Rowlands, these terms designate either the extent of moral protection or the extent of 
the possession of direct rights.  If the former, then Rowlands is clearly mistaken.  It is 
quite plausible that the set of rules that would result from our deliberations in the 
original position would include protection for inanimate objects like the pyramids.  If 
the latter, then what’s going on in this passage is Rowlands is changing his argument 
for animal rights.  It would seem Rowlands realizes that the scope of direct rights will 
be much too broad if X’s being protected by the agreed-upon rules is sufficient for 
X’s possession of such rights, so he suddenly adopts the entirely different and 
incompatible position that X’s being the sort of thing that there is something that it is 
to be like is necessary for X’s possession of direct rights. 
 Let’s set aside the worry about Rowlands’s consistency and simply focus on 
the idea that that X’s being the sort of thing that there is something that it is to be like 
is necessary for X’s possession of direct rights.  My worry is that this isn’t a 
particularly contractarian position.  One doesn’t arrive at a conclusion like this by 
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reasoning from a contractarian starting point—that is, by thinking about which rules 
could be agreed upon by self-interested contractors (perhaps from behind a veil of 
ignorance).  Granted, from a contractarian starting point one could, indeed would, 
reach the conclusion that there is something very important about the distinction 
between beings such that there is something that it is like to be them, and other 
beings: namely, the existence of the former sort of beings would constrain the 
deliberations of a rational contractor in a way that the existence of the latter sort of 
beings (or objects) would not.  But there is nothing particularly contractarian about 
saying that this difference grounds a difference in the possession of direct rights.  
Indeed, it is hard to see what motivation for saying this that there could be from 
within contractarianism.  
 A much more natural thing to say, from the contractarian perspective, is that 
whether an individual is the kind of being that can possess direct rights depends on 
whether he or she is, or could be, a party to the contract.  The idea would be that if I 
violate a rule that was agreed upon, or could have been agreed upon, by you and I in a 
contracting situation, then I have violated a direct right of yours. 
 This is a much more Hobbesian way of thinking about contractarianism than 
Rowlands would be comfortable with.  Rowlands is a Rawlsian, and he explicitly 
rejects the understanding of Rawlsian contractarianism on which the outcome of the 
original position has force in virtue of its modelling some hypothetical agreement.  
Rather, Rowlands (2009:136) insists, the original position simply models a certain 
method of moral reasoning, and what makes a moral consideration valid is that we 
each would arrive at it by reasoning in that way. 
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 I have no interest in arguing that this is a bad interpretation of Rawls or a bad 
version of contractarianism.  I simply want to point out that once we strip 
contractarianism of its distinctly contract-based element, then just as in Korsgaard’s 
theory there won’t be any fact of the matter as to whether animals have rights.  What 
we’re left with is the idea that the true moral constraints are those that we would want 
enshrined if we reasoned about the matter in a particular way.  As a solitary rational 
agent, thinking (from behind a veil of ignorance) about what I would want, all that 
would matter to me is that individuals do certain things and refrain from doing other 
things.  Therefore, all we can get from this version of contractarianism, it seems to 
me, is a sorting of actions into the categories of permissible, obligatory, and 
impermissible.  We cannot, I contend, extract from this version of contractarianism 
any further facts about who has rights, or claims, or is the object of duties, or can be 
wronged, etc.  But this is the agenda for non-consequentialist theories of animal 
ethics.   
In the end, then, Rowlands confronts the same problem that besets Korsgaard.  
If one has a broadly constructivist starting point, whether Kantian or Rawlsian-
contractarian, one is committed to saying that certain moral constraints are the 
deliverances of some real or hypothetical agent’s will or are the result of an 
agreement between the wills of multiple individuals.  But what agents will is simply 
that certain things be done or not done.  They don’t will, nor can they sensibly be 
imagined to will, that some act constitute the wronging of somebody.  So, in order to 
accommodate the idea that some actions constitute wronging, the constructivist needs 
to add to her theory the claim that when one violates one of the willed constraints one 
wrongs the individual or individuals whose wills set the constraints.  In other words, 
the constructivist needs to allow for something like a pre-existing moral constraint 
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against violating agreements or against subverting the will of others.  This would get 
the constructivist to the conclusion that all individuals whose wills help to determine 
the constraints can be wronged.  But it still wouldn’t get the constructivist to the 
conclusion that animals can be wronged, unless animals’ wills help to determine the 
constraints.  And neither Rowlands nor Korsgaard is arguing that they do. 
 Admittedly, Rowlands’s theory of animal ethics is an improvement on Kant’s.  
Among theories that, like Rowlands’s and Kant’s, allow that some of the things we 
might do to animals would be wrong but cannot allow for the possibility of wronging 
animals there is a distinction to be made between those that allow that some of the 
things we might do to animals are not just wrong but non-contingently wrong. Kant’s 
theory of animal ethics doesn’t allow this, since it relies on the contingent fact that by 
treating animals cruelly humans can get accustomed to being cruel in general.
9,10
 
Rowlands’s theory does, since under his version of contractarianism there is not 
supposed to be anything contingent about what a contractor would will from behind 
the veil of ignorance; there is only one correct way to deliberate in the Original 
Position.
11
 Still, however, Rowlands’s theory doesn’t get non-consequentialists what 
they should want.  
 
3.  Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
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Unlike Korsgaard and Rowlands, Nussbaum is interested in answering a question of 
political morality: What does the state owe to animals?
12
 This is a central question in 
her Frontiers of Justice.  However, Nussbaum believes that an answer to this question 
should be grounded in an answer to a question of morality-full-stop: What basic 
entitlements do animals have?  So Nussbaum’s answer to the just-stated question of 
political morality is supposed to be established by an argument of this format: 
 
1. Animals have basic entitlements to X. 
2. The state is obligated to secure all the basic entitlements. 
3. Therefore, the state is obligated to secure X for animals. 
 
I want to keep our focus, for the purposes of this review, on the morality-full-stop 
question of how ordinary individuals should treat animals.  So I’m going to focus only 
on premise 1 of the above argument,
13
 since it obviously has implications for the 
morality-full-stop question.
14
 
 Nussbaum contends that each individual who is capable of a dignified life is 
entitled to it, that living a life of dignity requires having the opportunity to flourish, 
and that having the opportunity to flourish involves possessing certain capabilities,
15
 
where a capability is an ability to do something or to be something (Nussbaum 
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an expansion of Nussbaum 2004. 
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2006:70).  So for Nussbaum the “X” in the above argument is to be replaced by a list 
of capabilities. 
 Knowing even this much about Nussbaum’s theory makes it clear that she is 
not going to confront the problem that beset Korsgaard and Rowlands.  There is no 
worry about a failure to ground duties to animals, since Nussbaum’s theory is built 
out of the idea an entitlement to dignity.  So if we deprive animals of X—the 
designated capabilities—we will be guilty of wronging them. 
 Nussbaum’s theory, then, emphasizes the moral importance of the individual.  
So although her theory gives a central place to the idea of flourishing, it is not a brand 
of utilitarianism.  Whereas the utilitarian begins by identifying a good or a set of 
goods of central moral importance, and then instructs us to act so as to bring about as 
many of those goods as possible, Nussbaum believes that we have a separate 
obligation, for each individual, to not deprive that individual of the goods that are 
particular to that individual—the goods that constitute its flourishing.16 (Nussbaum 
(2011b:158) departs from utilitarianism again in insisting that sentience is not 
sufficient for an animal’s being the kind of thing that can have entitlements; she says 
sentience plus “agency or striving” is necessary.17) 
 Therefore a central challenge for Nussbaum is to say how we are to determine 
for each individual what would constitute flourishing for that individual.  It is here, I 
contend, that her approach is at its weakest.  Whereas one might have thought that 
what constitutes flourishing for an individual depends exclusively on the properties of 
that individual, Nussbaum holds that what constitutes flourishing for an individual 
depends on its species membership.  Nussbaum (2006:365) says that for each species 
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 Nussbaum (2006:338-46) herself emphasizes how her theory departs from utilitarianism. 
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 Nussbaum (2006: 361-2) used to agree with the utilitarians on this point. 
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there is a species norm—an “account of central capabilities”—that “tells us what the 
appropriate benchmark is for judging whether a given creature has decent 
opportunities for flourishing.” 
 Part of Nussbaum’s argument18 for the superiority of the species-relative 
account is straightforwardly practical and strategic.  Nussbaum worries that if we 
release ourselves from the obligation to think of disabled humans as humans and as 
having the same mode of flourishing as other humans, then we make it all too easy to 
deceive ourselves about what it’s possible for us to do to support their flourishing, and 
we thereby render it quite likely that political institutions will end up doing very little 
for them.  
 Still, however, we can reasonably understand Nussbaum as holding that it’s 
true that an individual’s flourishing is a matter of her achieving a species-relative set 
of capabilities.  In any event, if Nussbaum’s capability theory is to provide the 
philosophical basis for answers to moral (as opposed to political) questions about our 
treatment of animals, we have to interpret it as including this claim.  This is what I 
will do moving forward. 
Nussbaum’s capability theory is flawed, I contend, on account of its inability 
to give a good answer to this question: For any given species, how can we come up 
with an account of the basic capabilities that are essential for the flourishing of a 
member of that species?  In the human case Nussbaum says we should start with an 
ethically evaluative idea of human nature; an idea of features of human life “that seem 
so normatively fundamental that a life without any possibility of exercising one of 
them, at any level, is not a fully human life…” (Nussbaum 2006:181). In earlier 
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 Specifically, the part that appears in Nussbaum 2006:188-90. 
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works Nussbaum (1992) spelled this out in greater detail.  Basically she proposed that 
we generate a list of such features via inductive generalization from cases.  We are to 
take real or imagined cases of individuals who are biologically human but lack some 
capability that biological humans usually have and then ask ourselves whether that 
person is living a fully human life.  If we have the intuition that they are, then this 
supports the generalization that the capability in question isn’t central for flourishing 
as a human.  And vice-versa. 
 Is it reasonable to assume that Nussbaum is still committed to this 
methodology?  In Frontiers of Justice she doesn’t even mention it; instead she 
emphasizes, in line with her broadly political agenda in that book, that the list of 
capabilities will have to be the result of public reasoning and political negotiation 
(Nussbaum 2006:160-64, 298-305).  Still, however, I think she’s committed to it.  In 
order for a public reasoning and political negotiation to get us anywhere, there have to 
be inputs to the process; people have to bring opinions to the table.  The question is, 
how are people going to generate judgments regarding which capabilities are central 
for human flourishing?  It seems that they would have to use Nussbaum’s inductive 
generalization method, as it’s not clear what the alternative would be. 
 As to how we should come up with accounts of flourishing for the other 
species, Nussbaum has never said anything.  In Frontiers of Justice Nussbaum 
(2006:392-401) offers conclusions regarding what the central aspects of flourishing 
for animals are, but they come off more as predictions regarding what would be 
agreed to after a process of public reasoning and political negotiation than as 
substantive assertions regarding flourishing.  This, again, leaves a question as to how 
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the judgments that constitute the inputs to such a process could be generated, and 
again I think the only option is to use the inductive generalization method. 
 Now that we see how important the inductive generalization method is for 
Nussbaum’s project, we should try to open it up and see how it works.  Given that 
Nussbaum is encouraging us to ask ourselves questions of the form, “Is capability X 
an essential element of flourishing for a member of Species Y”, she must believe that 
species distinctions are normatively relevant.  My question is this: In virtue of what 
are species distinctions normatively relevant?   
Nussbaum (2006:363) explicitly rejects views on which humans are set apart 
from other animals by bearing a special relation to God or God’s will.  Nor does she 
endorse a strictly biological notion of species, as she’s willing to say that some 
individuals that are born of human parents are not human (Nussbaum 2006:187).
19
 
And this is as it should be.  The theistic theory of the normative relevance of 
humanity is highly contentious; meanwhile the agenda for biologists is to carve out 
species distinctions in the way that best facilitates scientific inquiry, and it would 
therefore be an enormous coincidence of if their distinctions mapped on to anything 
of normative significance.
20
 
 I propose that the key is to be found in Nussbaum’s (2011b:161) claim that 
“the species plays a role in giving us a sense of a characteristic form of life that ought 
to be promoted.” Nussbaum doesn’t say what a form of life is, but fortunately we can 
appeal to Philippa Foot (and by extension Michael Thompson, since Foot draws on 
Thompson), the contemporary philosopher who has done the most to substantiate 
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(chap. 4). 
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such talk.  According to Foot, different kinds of being display differing forms of life.  
For each kind, we can identify true “Aristotelian categoricals” such as “rabbits eat 
grass”, or “wolves hunt in packs”.  A set of such categoricals defines the kind’s form 
of life by expressing how that “kind of plant or animal, considered at a particular time 
and in its natural habitat, develops, sustains itself, defends itself, and reproduces” 
(Foot 2001:29).  And the life form, in turn, “determines how an individual plant or 
animal should be” (Foot 2011:33).  This gets us to the idea that there is normative 
relevance to form of life.  Now it’s an easy step to the normative relevance of species: 
we simply need to add that there is a distinction in form of life everywhere there is a 
species distinction, which is probably just what Nussbaum meant to say in that 
passage quoted at the outset of this paragraph. 
 The problem for Nussbaum here is that she’s importing too much 
Aristotelianism into her ethical theory.  Of course, as if this needed to be said, there is 
plenty of value, and perhaps a great deal worth retaining, in Aristotle’s ethics and 
politics, and Nussbaum is quite forthright in drawing upon his ideas.  But this 
particular bit of Aristotelianism—this talk of forms of life, is dubious.  Nussbaum 
herself has nearly ceased such talk entirely.  Whereas it was rampant in her earlier 
work,
21
 she deploys it sparingly her two most recent books on the capabilities 
approach.
22
 It’s as if Nussbaum senses that she’s wading into dangerous territory with 
such talk. 
 What’s so worrying about talk of forms of life?  For Aristotle, the idea of a 
form of life is a component of his natural teleology.  (Nussbaum (2006:182), 
incidentally, says that the capabilities theory doesn’t rely on natural teleology; I’m 
                                                          
21
 See, for instance, Nussbaum 1992. 
22
 I’ve identified just one use of such language in Nussbaum 2011b, namely in the passage I quoted 
above.  I’ve also found just one use of such language in Nussbaum 2006 (on p. 78). 
 22 
suggesting here that it does.) Natural teleology is the view that the nature of a thing 
determines how that thing ought to be.  And for Aristotle, a thing’s nature depends on 
its form of life, which in turn depends on what kind it’s a member of.  I find this all 
pretty objectionable, but for the sake of argument I’ll allow it to go unchallenged.  
What I want to resist is the final element of Aristotle’s natural teleology: the idea that 
the salient kind for a living thing is its species. 
 Nussbaum has to hang on to that last component, otherwise the whole project 
of coming up with a distinct capability list for each species is undermined (or, 
alternatively, Nussbaum has to abandon the “form of life” argument for the normative 
relevance of species distinctions).  This would be a profound problem for Nussbaum, 
as a large part of her agenda is to establish that cognitively impaired humans have 
entitlements that are different from those of similarly cognitively sophisticated 
animals.  Nussbaum has no argument for this claim if she is forced to renounce her 
contention that distinctions in modes of flourishing line up with species distinctions.  
For then it would make no difference that cognitively impaired humans and animals 
are members of different species. 
But the problem is that if we admit, as Nussbaum did, that how biologists 
draw species distinctions makes it highly doubtful that such distinctions could map on 
to anything normatively relevant, then, since the species distinctions with which we 
operate just are the ones from biology, we have no reason to believe that there is a 
distinction in form of life everywhere there is a distinction in species.  There could 
instead be more fine-grained distinctions in form of life, perhaps corresponding to 
ordinary distinctions in sub-species, or more coarse-grained distinctions in form of 
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life, corresponding to ordinary distinctions at the level of phylum or genus.  Foot 
(2001:29) herself admits as much. 
 This is not to say that when one asks oneself the question, “Is capability X an 
essential element of flourishing for a member of Species Y,” one will be unable to 
come up with an answer.  So this is not to say that Nussbaum’s inductive 
generalization method will fail on account of our being unable to form the judgments 
that constitute the inputs to the method.  Rather, it is to say that the method will fail if, 
and to the extent that, people accept that the way biologists draw species distinctions 
makes it highly dubious that such distinctions carry normative weight. 
 So Nussbaum’s method of inductive generalization for generating capability 
lists for each of the species can be completed only to the extent that people fail to 
acknowledge what Nussbaum herself admits about the normative relevance species 
distinctions.  Therefore, the viability of Nussbaum’s inductive generalization strategy 
for discovering what would constitute flourishing for different beings requires the 
persistence of judgments that she rejects.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
I began this essay by endorsing a specific agenda for non-consequentialist theories of 
animal ethics: they have to improve on Kant, where improving on Kant means 
showing how certain things we do to animals aren’t merely wrong but constitute 
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wronging of the animal itself.  I then argued that three contemporary non-
consequentialists—Korsgaard, Rowlands and Nussbaum—have each failed to do this. 
 It is difficult to draw any general conclusions from each of these three failures.  
Although from a certain reflective distance the problems that beset Korsgaard and 
Rowlands can be seen as broadly of the same kind, as I explained at the end of §2, 
there are no defects in common to all three theories.  Allowing ourselves to speak 
very abstractly, perhaps the most that can be said is that non-consequentialists would 
do well to experiment with approaching animal ethics more individualistically.  This 
means seeing the animal as a source of moral constraints in virtue of its intrinsic 
features, such that its similarity to humans and its species membership make no 
difference to the existence or content of the constraints. 
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